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SUCCESS OR FAILURE? JAPAN’S NATIONAL 
STRATEGY ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND EVALUATION OF ITS IMPACT FROM THE 
COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE 
TOSHIKO TAKENAKA∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s when I studied at the University of 
Washington under Professor Haley’s guidance, Japan’s economy and 
international competitiveness were at their peak. With respect to my study 
of Japan’s patent system, Professor Haley suggested that Japan adopted a 
patent policy similar to that of developing countries although it had 
already become a developed country. He felt that Japan’s economy had 
developed so quickly that the minds of political leaders were unable to 
catch up with the country’s swift development. The U.S. government 
viewed Japanese industry as engaging in unfair business practice by 
infringing on intellectual property (“IP”) rights, which led to Japan’s 
strong competitiveness vis-à-vis U.S. industry. Japan’s patent system was 
extensively criticized by U.S. companies for the narrow scope of patent 
rights granted by the Japan Patent Office (“JPO”) and the restrictive 
interpretation of those rights by the Japanese patent courts.  
Only after experiencing a deep recession did the Japanese government 
discover that its economy had matured and that strong protection of its 
intellectual assets would help to recover its international competitiveness. 
In 1997, the Japanese government published a report on the national 
strategy to revive the economy.1 Since then, Japan has been determined to 
become a “nation built on intellectual property” by adopting a national 
strategy on IP.2 To accomplish this goal, Japan enacted the Basic Law on 
Intellectual Property (“Basic IP Law”)3 and began to overhaul its IP 
 
 
 ∗ Washington Research Foundation Professor of Technology Law; Director, Center for 
Advanced Study and Research on Intellectual Property; Associate Director, University of Washington 
School of Law, IP Law & Policy LL.M.; Visiting Professor, Waseda Law School, Tokyo, Japan.  
 1. COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, TOWARD THE ERA OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CREATION: CHALLENGES FOR BREAKTHROUGH (1997), available at 
http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/toushin_e/kenkyukai_e/21cene.htm. 
 2. STRATEGIC COUNCIL ON INTELLECTUAL PROP., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY OUTLINE 
(2002), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/titeki/kettei/020703taikou_e.html#0-2. 
 3. Basic Law on Intellectual Property, Law No. 122 of 2002. An English translation is available 
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system.4 This overhaul included a review of not only IP laws and IP 
enforcement mechanisms, but also the educational system for IP 
professionals. 
This short Article will discuss Japan’s national IP strategy and changes 
brought to the IP system, focusing on features that follow the U.S. IP 
system. Additionally, it will review these changes from the comparative 
law perspective and evaluate whether the new system has accomplished its 
national strategy mission. 
II. JAPAN’S NATIONAL IP STRATEGY 
A. Basic IP Law 
In the 1980s, Japan hit its peak economic power due to the low labor 
costs associated with well-trained Japanese workers and improvements to 
manufacturing technologies imported from the United States and Europe. 
However, Japan’s competitiveness rapidly declined in the nineties as it 
faced challenges from China and other emerging markets when Japanese 
labor costs gradually increased.5 Learning from the United States, which 
revived its economy through the Reagan and Bush administrations’ 
adoption of a “pro-patent policy,” the Japanese government enhanced its 
international competitiveness by strengthening protection and encouraging 
exploitation of intellectual property. Strong leadership was necessary to 
accomplish this goal, so the Japanese government created the Strategic 
Council on Intellectual Property, consisting of Prime Minister Koizumi 
and his Cabinet, along with legal professionals, scientists, academics, and 
representatives from industry.6 Under the slogan of turning Japan into an 
“IP-based nation,” the IP Council published an extended list of action 
plans and announced a recommendation to enact a law to execute the plans 
by establishing a policy headquarters housed in the cabinet.7 Adopting the 
 
 
at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/titeki/021204kihon_e.pdf. 
 4. See Toshiko Takenaka & Ichirō Nakayama, Will Intellectual Property Policy Save Japan 
from Recessions? Japan’s Basic Intellectual Property Policy and Its Implementation Through the 
National Strategic Program, 35 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 877 (2004). 
 5. INT’L INST. FOR MGMT. DEV., IMD WORLD COMPETITIVENESS YEARBOOK (on file with 
author); see also MINISTRY OF FINANCE, TRANSITION OF JAPAN’S INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 
POWER, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20051217091651/http://www.mof.go.jp/singikai/ 
sangyokanze/tosin/sk1406mt_37.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). 
 6. For information on the Strategic Council on Intellectual Property, see Prime Minister of 
Japan & His Cabinet, Concerning the Strategic Council of Intellectual Property (Provisional 
Translation) (Feb. 25, 2002), http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/titeki/konkyo_e.html. 
 7. See STRATEGIC COUNSEL ON INTELLECTUAL PROP., supra note 2. 
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recommendation, the Basic IP Law was enacted in November 2002 and 
became effective in March 2003.8 Unlike existing IP laws, the Basic IP 
Law does not affect private party rights and duties. Instead, the law gives 
direction to IP policy by setting forth a fundamental mission with respect 
to Japan’s national strategy.9 It also sets forth the roles of government, 
industry and academics in executing the strategy, 10 while listing measures 
necessary to accomplish the individual groups’ missions.11 
B. Execution of National Strategy 
The Basic IP Law gave the Japanese government the power to establish 
an IP Strategy Headquarters (“Headquarters”) within the Cabinet.12 This 
power, some suggest, may have been designed to parallel the Patent and 
Copyright Clause in the U.S. Constitution.13 In truth, however, this law 
was Japan’s unique solution to problems resulting from internal power 
competition. In the past, ministries and agencies often fought over 
jurisdiction when introducing bills involving new IP-related issues.14 This 
competition for power made it difficult for Japan to develop a 
comprehensive IP policy covering the jurisdictions of various ministries 
and agencies.  
To make a comprehensive overhaul of the IP system possible and to 
execute a uniform IP policy, the Japanese government had to implement a 
strategy that superseded ministerial and agency levels. Very strong 
leadership was necessary to execute action plans that the ministries had 
already failed to execute prior to the creation of the Headquarters. The 
Prime Minister and his Cabinet members have provided this leadership 
since the Headquarters’ creation in March 2003. Its composition has 
remained the same, even when Mr. Koizumi’s successors took over the 
Prime Minister’s office.  
 
 
 8. Basic Law on Intellectual Property Law No. 122 of 2002. An English translation is available 
at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/titeki/hourei/021204kihon_e.pdf. 
 9. Id. arts. 3–4. 
 10. Id. arts. 5–8. 
 11. Id. arts. 12–18. 
 12. Id. art. 24. 
 13. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 14. A good example is the issue relating to computer software protection; it is well known that 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (“METI”) and the Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science and Technology (“MEXT”) compete over how to reform the Copyright Act to protect 
computer software. See NOBUHIRO NAKAYAMA, LEGAL PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE 11–17 
(1986). 
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The Headquarters has its own secretariat, comprised of bureaucrats 
dispatched from ministries and agencies in charge of various aspects of 
intellectual property. This bureaucratic “think-tank” was led by Mr. 
Hisamitsu Arai, a former Japanese Patent Office (“JPO”) Commissioner.15 
He shared Professor Haley’s view that Japan’s IP policy was outdated, and 
thus led the JPO in an extensive campaign to promote the status of IP 
rights and raise the awareness of such rights among politicians.16 
Headquarters bureaucrats function as liaison officers for the ministries and 
agencies from which they are dispatched so that policies and legislation 
developed by the Headquarters are executed effectively and uniformly 
throughout the government.  
In addition to creating this secretariat, the Headquarters executed the 
national strategy by developing a program for promoting creation, 
protection, and exploitation of intellectual property; listing action plans; 
and reviewing the execution of such plans by ministries and agencies.17 
Since the publication of its first program in July 2003, the Headquarters 
has published revised annual programs, each listing more than two 
hundred action plans.18 Although the Headquarters does not directly 
execute these plans, it makes clear in the program which ministries and 
agencies are responsible for plan execution and organizes its own task 
force to develop policies to execute the action plans for the most important 
issues requiring strong leadership. Soon after it was created, the 
Headquarters selected medical method patent protection, media contents 
protection, and intellectual property enforcement to receive supervision 
from expert task forces.19  
Action plans listed in the annual program are classified into five areas: 
(1) creation, (2) protection, (3) exploitation, (4) media contents protection, 
 
 
 15. HISAMITSU ARAI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: 
THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE IN WEALTH CREATION (1999). After retiring from METI, Hisamitsu Arai 
organized the Intellectual Property National Strategy Forum and prepared proposals to revise Japanese 
intellectual property laws. The IP Strategy Forum’s website is http://www.smips.jp/IP_forum/. 
Members of the Forum recommended one hundred proposals to change the Japanese IP system. See 
Hisamitsu Arai, Country Focus: IP Revolution—How Japan Formulated a National IP Strategy, 
WIPO MAG., June 2007, at 14, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/pdf/2007/wipo_ 
pub_121_2007_03.pdf [hereinafter IP Revolution]. 
 16. IP Revolution, supra note 15. 
 17. Id.  
 18. English translations of all programs are available at http://www.ipr.go.jp/e_materials.html 
(follow hyperlinks under the “Intellectual Property Strategic Program” heading) (last visited Feb. 7, 
2009). 
 19. See INTELLECTUAL PROP. POLICY HEADQUARTERS, STRATEGIC PROGRAM FOR CREATION, 
PROTECTION AND EXPLOITATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2003), available at http://www.kantei. 
go.jp/foreign/policy/titeki/kettei/030708f_e.html [hereinafter 2003 STRATEGIC PROGRAM]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss2/14
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and (5) human resources. Important action plans in the area of creation 
relate to enhancing incentives for scientists and researchers in Japanese 
universities to develop basic and applied technologies and to the 
establishment of mechanisms to comprehensively manage IP in such 
technologies.20 Action plans in the area of protection include both 
procurement and enforcement of IP rights. Since IP rights are useless 
unless enforced effectively, the Headquarters places a strong emphasis on 
improving enforcement mechanisms and consequently organizes its own 
task forces to secure prompt and strong protection. Action plans in the first 
program included a review of the court system and a recommendation to 
create a special court with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals arising from 
technology-related IP rights.21 Execution of these plans may sacrifice the 
independence of courts and interfere with the balance of power between 
administrative and judicial branches.22 Regarding the area of exploitation, 
Headquarters acknowledged the importance of industry initiative by 
increasing the commercialization of unexploited technologies. Thus, the 
program listed action plans to provide infrastructure to deliver information 
about such technologies to those who might be interested in 
commercialization.23 Action plans in the area of media content protection 
call for developing a mechanism for comprehensive media content 
management to reinforce protection of intellectual property rights in the 
contents.24 The long list of action plans concludes with those in the area of 
human resources by recommending an introduction of IP education 
systems for both lawyers and non-lawyers. 25 
III. PHASE ONE: FIRST THREE YEARS SELF-ASSESSMENT 
The Japanese government set a goal to become one of the most 
advanced IP-based nations within the first three years of the enactment of 
the Basic IP Law. It published a self-assessment report on improvements 
resulting from the execution of action plans in 2007.26 Some developments 
 
 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. The Supreme Court of Japan has exclusive power to determine the career path of all Japanese 
judges. Michael K. Young & Constance C. Hamilton, Introduction to Japanese Law, 1 JAPAN 
BUSINESS LAW GUIDE 7–550 (1988), reprinted in YUKIO YANAGIDA ET AL., LAW AND INVESTMENT IN 
JAPAN: CASES AND MATERIALS 63, 64 (1995). 
 23. See 2003 STRATEGIC PROGRAM, supra note 19. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  
 26. IP STRATEGIC HEADQUARTERS, CHITEKIZAISANSENRYAKU NO SHINCHOKUJYŌKYŌ [STATUS 
OF EXECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIES] (2007) [hereinafter SELF-ASSESSMENT 
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recognized as “major progress” in the report are particularly interesting, 
from the comparative law perspective, because they were inspired by the 
following examples from the United States: (1) the establishment of 
technology license offices at Japanese universities in the area of creation, 
(2) the creation of a high court in the area of protection, and (3) the 
restructuring of the education system for IP professional training. 
A. Creation: The Japanese Bayh-Dole System 
The Self-Assessment Report lists the establishment of IP offices for 
Japanese universities and the increase in the number of patent applications 
and license revenues for Japanese universities as indicative of major 
progress in the area of creation.27 The Basic IP Law introduced a 
significant change in the university technology transfer system and made it 
possible for IP offices to comprehensively manage IP rights in the results 
of research performed by university professors and researchers. Before the 
enactment of the Basic IP Law, Japanese university professors and 
researchers retained such IP rights under the rule in the Guidelines 
published by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology (“MEXT”).28 In Japan, major research universities are 
national universities, which were part of MEXT and had never been given 
the status of independent legal entities. Thus, they were bound by the 
MEXT rule and were unable to own IP rights. Although private 
universities were not bound by the MEXT rule, they nevertheless followed 
the example of the national universities. If professors wanted to 
commercialize their technologies, they needed to find industry partners 
and make their own arrangements for technology transfer. 
In the United States, enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act29 and other 
technology transfer-related acts in the 1980s has effectively promoted 
university-industry collaboration and commercialization of new 
 
 
REPORT], available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/kettei/070531siryou.pdf.  
 27. Id. at 1–3. 
 28. Monbukagakushō [MEXT], Kokuritsu Daigakutō no Kyōkantō no Hatsumei ni kakaru 
Tokkyotō no Toriatsukai ni tuite: Monbushō Gakujyutsu Kokusai Kyokuchō, Monbushō Daijinkanbō 
Kaikeikachō Tsūchi, BungakuJyo 117 Gō [Handling of Patents Relating to Inventions by Faculty of 
National Universities: Monbushō Science Notification No. 117] (Mar. 15, 1978). For information on 
IP ownership rules and procedures regarding industry-university collaborative research under this 
notice, see Robert Kneller, University-Industry Cooperation and Technology Transfer in Japan 
Compared with the United States: Another Reason for Japan’s Economic Malaise?, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 329, 365 (2003). 
 29. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2000). 
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technologies.30 Before its enactment, the federal government—not 
researchers or universities—retained ownership of patents in technologies 
resulting from federally funded research. Without any technology transfer 
activities by the government, the majority of such patents were not 
exploited. Allowing universities to retain patent rights through the Bayh-
Dole Act encouraged the licensing of university inventions to industries 
and resulted in a significant increase in the numbers of patent applications 
from American universities and royalty revenues from U.S. industries.  
Following the U.S. example, Japan’s Diet enacted the Technology 
Transfer Promotion Law in 199831 and the Japanese version of the Bayh-
Dole Act as part of the Industrial Revitalization Special Law in 1999.32 
These enactments led private universities to change ownership rules and 
establish technology license offices at their universities. However, national 
universities were unable to take full advantage of these enactments 
because they were unable to own IP rights unless they formed a legal 
entity. But MEXT soon enacted a law to reform national universities, 
which became effective in April of 2004.33 The law gave national 
universities a legal entity to own IP rights and flexibility to set their own 
rules to manage such rights. With a recommendation in the 2003 Strategic 
Program followed by MEXT endorsement, the majority of national and 
private universities adopted a Bayh-Dole style rule to ensure their 
ownership of IP rights resulting from the use of university facilities.34 In 
executing action plans in the 2003 Strategic Program, MEXT provided 
universities with funds to establish their technology transfer offices and 
cover costs of patent prosecution and licensing. As of July 2003, forty-
three Japanese universities have set up their own technology transfer 
 
 
 30. The Bayh-Dole Act and other technology transfer-related legislation were enacted to amend 
U.S. patent law. For a detailed discussion of the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act and the U.S. technology transfer 
system, see infra note 34; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents 
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1671 (1996). 
 31. Daigakutō ni okeru gijutsu ni kansuru kenkyū seika no minkan jigyōsha he no iten no 
sokushin ni kansuru hōritsu [The Law for Promoting University-Industry Technology Transfer], Law 
No. 52 of 1998. 
 32. Sangyō Katsuryoku Saisei Tokubetsu Sochihō [Industrial Revitalization Law], Law No. 131 
of 1999, ch. 3, arts. 30–33. General information about the law is available in English at 
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/information/data/cIP9972e.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2009). 
 33. Kokuritsu daigaku hōjinhō [National University Legal Entity Law], Law No. 112 of 2003. 
 34. This resulted in ninety-five percent of national universities and thirty-seven percent of public 
and private universities adopting the rule that universities retain the ownership of IP rights in 
inventions that fall within the scope of employee inventions under article 35 of the Patent Law. SELF-
ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 26, at 3. 
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offices, which has led to a significant increase in patent issuance and 
license revenues to these universities.35  
B. Protection: The Court System 
The United States has also clearly been influential in the area of 
protection with respect to the restructuring of the court system and the 
passing of legislation for IP infringement remedies. Since 1999, the 
Japanese government has focused its attention on court proceedings in 
order to enforce IP rights through its Justice System Reform Initiative.36 
This effort resulted in the 2003 revision of the Japanese Code of Civil 
Procedure,37 which gave exclusive jurisdiction to Tokyo and Osaka 
District Courts for cases involving infringement of patents, utility model 
registrations, integrated circuit layout design rights, and computer program 
copyrights. The revision also concentrated appeals of related IP cases to 
the Tokyo High Court. This change made the Tokyo High Court Japan’s 
de facto IP High Court, with exclusive jurisdiction over both infringement 
and validity disputes regarding patents and other intellectual property 
rights involving technologies. 
Despite the changes brought by the 2003 civil procedure revision, the 
2003 Strategic Program required the creation of an IP High Court.38 
Japanese judges who handled technology-related IP cases had the 
necessary expertise, even without any restructuring, because IP cases were 
sent to the IP special divisions at the Tokyo and Osaka District Courts and 
the Tokyo High Court.39 Although the Supreme Court of Japan has long 
adopted a policy of transferring judges from one court to another every 
two or three years, judges who are appointed to an IP special division are 
 
 
 35. Id. at 1–2. The number of patents issued has increased 3.6 times and license revenues have 
increased 4.3 times between 2002 and 2005.  
 36. Shihō seido kaikaku suishinhō [The Justice System Reform Promotion Law] Law No. 119 of 
2001; see also Reports on the Office for Promotion of Justice System Reform, available at 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/index_e.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2009). 
 37. Minji soshōhō [Law for Revising Part of the Civil Procedure Law], Law No. 108 of 2003, 
art. 6, para. 1 (amending Minji soshōhō [Civil Procedure Law] Law No. 109 of 1998). 
 38. 2003 STRATEGIC PROGRAM, supra note 19, at 52. 
 39. For a general discussion of Japanese IP enforcement proceedings before the 2003 Civil 
Procedure Law Revision, see generally Ryū Takabayashi, Practices of Patent Litigation in Japanese 
Courts, CASRIP NEWSLETTER (Ctr. for Advanced Study & Research on Intellectual Prop., Univ. of 
Wash. Sch. of Law, Seattle, Wash.) Spring/Summer 1998, at 13, available at http://www.law. 
washington.edu/CASRIP/newsletter/vol5/newsv5i2jp2.html; Toshiko Takenaka, Comparison of U.S. 
and Japanese Court Systems for Patent Litigation: A Special Court or Special Divisions in a General 
Court?, in STREAMLINING INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASRIP SYMPOSIUM 
PUBLICATION SERIES NO. 5 (Ctr., for Advanced Study & Research on Intellectual Prop. ed., 2000), 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/CASRIP/Symposium/Number5/pub5atcl6.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss2/14
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exempt from transfer in order to develop their expertise in IP law and the 
technologies involved in IP disputes. Once judges were appointed to one 
of the IP special divisions, they either stayed for more than three years or 
returned to the special divisions, even if transferred to other courts. 
Further, judges who had experience with IP were assisted by technical 
assistants called Chōsa-kan, who were senior examiners dispatched by the 
JPO and well-experienced patent attorneys temporarily appointed by the 
Supreme Court of Japan. Thus, these divisions also have the legal and the 
technical expertise to handle complex IP cases. 
However, these divisions were still part of the general courts of the 
Tokyo and Osaka District Courts and Tokyo High Court. Considering 
recent developments in the creation of IP courts in the United States, 
Europe, and Asia, the Headquarters urged Japanese courts to follow the 
world trend and create an IP High Court to signify Japan’s commitment to 
IP protection. Consequently, in April 2005, an IP High Court was created 
as a “semi-independent” court that has its own administrative power and 
its own secretariat, but remains a branch of the Tokyo High Court.40 This 
unique organizational structure resulted from a compromise between the 
Japanese courts’ need to maintain the long tradition throughout their 
judicial history of avoiding the creation of any specialized court and the 
Japanese government’s request that the courts enhance their capability to 
hear complicated cases involving cutting-edge technology and making 
proper decisions in a foreseeable and timely manner. 
In Japanese high courts, a three-judge panel hears an appeal from 
district courts. 41 To hear special cases that involve complex legal issues 
and significant policy implications promptly and effectively, the Japanese 
IP High Court introduced an enlarged board system inspired by the en 
banc hearing system in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
which has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals arising from U.S. patents.42 
Unlike the en banc U.S. Federal Circuit, the enlarged board does not 
consist entirely of IP High Court judges; instead, it consists of presiding 
judges from all four divisions and the IP High Court President.  
 
 
 40. Chitekizaisan kōtōsaibansho secchihō [Law for Establishing Intellectual Property High 
Court], Law No. 119 of 2004. 
 41. For an overview of Japan’s judicial system, see DAN FENNO HENDERSON & JOHN OWEN 
HALEY, LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN, reprinted in YANAGIDA ET AL., supra note 22, at 39. 
 42. No other high court in the Japanese system except the IP High Court has an enlarged board 
decision system.  
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C. Human Resources 
The Japanese government recognized the key role of IP professionals 
in its national strategies. However, it viewed them as not ready to 
competitively support Japanese IP owners in the global market because 
they lacked a science background and also because of the language barrier. 
Thus, the action plans in the 2003 Strategic Program included a legal 
education review to increase the number of lawyers and patent attorneys 
and improve the quality of their representation in IP cases.43 To attain this 
goal, the Japanese government again looked to the United States; this time, 
it focused on American law schools and U.S.-style lawyer training.  
Ideally, IP professionals should be competent not only in law but also 
in technology and business. Japanese legal education follows the German 
tradition and educates law students at the undergraduate level, making it 
difficult to educate lawyers who also have a scientific background and 
business experience. To reflect the educational background division, IP 
professionals are divided into two categories: (1) general IP attorneys 
(Bengoshi), who are law faculty graduates, and (2) patent attorneys 
(Benrishi), the majority of whom are science and engineering faculty 
graduates. The number of examinees who passed the national bar exam 
was very small, giving Japanese lawyers a monopoly in the practice of 
law. As a result, very few lawyers have been eager to specialize in IP law, 
and particularly in patent law. To improve legal services through 
competition, the Japanese government introduced a new system to educate 
law students at the graduate level through the Judicial System Reform 
Initiatives, thus following the U.S. model of legal education.44 As a result, 
more than seventy Japanese universities created “American-style” law 
schools in April 2004. 
However, the Japanese government did not think legal education 
reform would bring about sufficient improvement in the quantity and 
quality of IP professionals required by the action plans. So, to encourage 
law students to take IP-related courses, the Ministry of Justice changed the 
content of the national bar exam to include IP as an optional subject. 
Furthermore, MEXT strongly encouraged universities to include IP 
courses at various levels of education, including both the undergraduate 
 
 
 43. See 2003 STRATEGIC PROGRAM, supra note 19, at 69. 
 44. Reforming legal education is one of the measures listed in the recommendations by the 
Judicial System Reform Council. THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL: FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2001), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/990612_e.html. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss2/14
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and graduate levels.45 As a result, all “American-style” law schools offer at 
least one IP course, and the number of universities that offer IP courses for 
non-law school students has significantly increased.46  
IV. COMPARATIVE LAW ANALYSIS 
Overall, Japan’s national strategies place its IP system more in line 
with its U.S. counterpart by mirroring U.S. legislation and IP 
infrastructures. However, the Japanese government did not simply aim to 
copy the U.S. system; it tried to develop an original strategy to meet the 
unique needs of Japanese industry and society.47 Importing the U.S. 
system, which is based on the common law tradition, presented a big 
challenge because the Japanese judicial system is based on the civil law 
system, particularly the German system. This is especially true with 
respect to Japanese patent and other IP laws because most of the original 
provisions in the current statutes are translations of their German 
counterparts.48 Some of the imported U.S. systems would have had 
significantly reduced effects, and thus were considerably modified to fit 
into Japanese tradition. Other systems failed to work or will need more 
time to become part of the Japanese system. This process of localizing a 
foreign legal system led to the development of a strategy unique to Japan, 
which was important to the Japanese government.49 
One of most successful measures in the Japanese structure is the Bayh-
Dole system. Japan now has as many technology transfer offices as the 
United States.50 Although the number of patents and license revenues are 
significantly lower than those of U.S. technology license offices, this 
difference can be explained by the short history of Japanese license 
offices. It is very likely that applications claiming valuable inventions are 
still pending and have not yet been issued. The number of university 
invention-based spin-offs has also steadily increased.51 According to the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (“METI”), these spin-offs have 
positively impacted Japan’s economy by creating jobs and introducing 
new products and services.52  
 
 
 45. 2003 STRATEGIC PROGRAM, supra note 19, at 70–72. 
 46. SELF-ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 26, at 48. 
 47. 2003 STRATEGIC PROGRAM, supra note 19. 
 48. For information on Japanese patent statutes, see TOSHIKO TAKENAKA, INTERPRETING 
PATENT CLAIMS: THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY AND JAPAN 39–45 (1995). 
 49. See generally 2003 STRATEGIC PROGRAM, supra note 19. 
 50. SELF-ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 26, at 3. 
 51. Id. at 6. 
 52. Id. METI’s statistics report sixteen thousand new jobs directly created by the university spin-
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This success was made possible by the heavy subsidization from the 
Japanese government used to operate these offices. The JPO not only 
deeply discounts or waives its official fees, but it also accelerates the 
examination process for applications filed by universities. Further, the JPO 
also established an office to support universities and dispatch university IP 
advisors on the JPO’s budget. In addition to this assistance with domestic 
applications, MEXT covers patent prosecution costs for foreign 
applications. In contrast, U.S. technology transfer offices receive little to 
no financial support from federal or state governments for patent 
procurement. 
However, these offices will face a financial challenge when MEXT’s 
funding expires in March of 2009. Thus, MEXT will likely be more 
selective and only renew its support of technology transfer offices that 
operate efficiently and bring in license revenues. Statistics clearly show a 
significant increase in patenting costs, which force these offices to cover 
more than half of their budgets through funding from the universities.53 
The average age of technology managers in Japanese technology transfer 
offices is much higher than that of U.S. managers because many Japanese 
offices are run by retired JPO examiners and retired in-house counsels. In 
other words, the Japanese Bayh-Dole system created amakudari positions, 
but did not necessarily create training opportunities for young engineers.54 
This stands in stark contrast to U.S. technology managers who are fresh 
from post-doctoral positions at U.S. universities. Having highly paid 
managers whose salaries are based on the seniority system makes 
operation expensive and inefficient. Without MEXT support, these offices 
will go out of business or will be forced to merge with other offices.  
In the area of protection, there has been both tremendous success and 
failure. The Japanese government was successful in creating a court 
system more advanced than its U.S. counterpart in dealing with IP issues. 
The new system provides IP and technology expertise for all three levels 
from its district to the Supreme Court of Japan. In contrast, the U.S. 
system provides expertise only for the intermediate level through the 
creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.55 Moreover, 
the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction is limited in that it only hears 
 
 
offs and twenty million yen produced by these spin-offs. 
 53. Id. at 1. 
 54. Amakudari is the Japanese practice of placing retiring senior government officers in high 
profile positions in both the private and public sectors.  
 55. To address the lack-of-expertise problem, the U.S. Congress is considering a bill to start a 
pilot program to assign patent cases to selected district judges. See H.R. 34, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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appeals arising from U.S. patent disputes and does not hear appeals from 
trademark and copyright disputes.56 The Federal Circuit’s power to 
examine factual issues is very limited because it examines them under 
either the “clearly erroneous” standard or the “substantial evidence” 
standard.57 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed the Federal 
Circuit’s en banc decision to remove the issue of claim interpretation from 
jury power,58 a variety of issues remain questions of fact and are thus to be 
decided by a jury. Such questions include literal infringement, 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, and whether a defendant’s 
infringement was willful.59 As a result, parties in patent cases must 
educate not only inexperienced district court judges, but also jurors.60 This 
is also true with respect to appellate court judges of computer software 
copyright and other technology-related IP cases and Supreme Court 
Justices. 
The Japanese Government was unsuccessful in its attempt to create a 
new IP High Court, which would have signified Japan’s commitment to a 
pro-patent policy. For instance, the U.S. Federal Circuit, upon which 
Japan’s IP High Court was modeled, has improved the legal certainty of 
U.S. patents and lowered the chance of invalidity.61 In contrast, the IP 
High Court struck down so many patents that the validity rate has fallen as 
low as that of the U.S. patents enforced in regional appeal courts before 
the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.62  
This legal uncertainty in Japanese patent validity also resulted from the 
adoption of a U.S. patent system feature that allowed accused infringers to 
raise a defense of invalidity in infringement proceedings. Traditionally, 
Japanese courts followed the German system and developed case law that 
gave exclusive jurisdiction to the JPO regarding patent validity. 
Defendants of infringement proceedings had to file an invalidation trail 
with the JPO if they wanted to contest the patent validity. The Japanese 
Supreme Court changed this practice in the Kilby decision,63 giving 
 
 
 56. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(c) (2000). 
 57. KIMBERLY MOORE ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 718 (2d ed. 2003). 
 58. Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996). 
 59. MOORE, supra note 57, at 719. 
 60. For interesting statistical data regarding the determination of issues by U.S. judges and 
jurors, see generally Kimberly Moore, Judges, Juries and Patent Cases: An Empirical Peek Inside the 
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000).  
 61. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 
26 AIPLA Q. J. 185, 205 (1989). 
 62. GLORIA KOENING, PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS, 
§ 3.01 (2d ed. 1980).  
 63. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Fugitsū Corp. (Kilby Case), 54 MINSHŪ 1268 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 11, 
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Japanese courts the power to examine a patent’s validity and refuse to 
enforce the patent if it is found obviously invalid. The JPO codified this 
new power by revising the patent law,64 but failed to copy the presumption 
of validity from the U.S. patent statute.65 The low burden of proof for 
establishing invalidity encouraged defendants to frequently raise this 
defense, which led to a high invalidity rate.66 Influenced by the high 
patentability hurdle in Japanese courts, the chance of a patent application 
being rejected or an existing patent being invalidated by the JPO has also 
significantly increased.67 
The Government also failed to change the amount of damages awarded 
to remedy Japanese patent infringement to be more in line with those 
available to U.S. patent owners. Alarmed by a huge gap between patent 
infringement damages awarded by American as opposed to Japanese 
courts, the JPO introduced the 1998 Japanese patent law revision by 
codifying U.S. case law doctrine for establishing lost profits.68 Early cases 
awarding big damages led the Japanese patent community to believe that 
the revision made Japanese judges’ views significantly more patent-
friendly. A speedy proceeding and the expectation of big damages led to a 
significant increase in cases filed with both the Tokyo and Osaka district 
courts.69 However, more recent statistics indicate a decrease in the average 
amount of damages awarded in Japanese courts.70 The proportion of the 
amount awarded to the amount claimed by the patentees has also declined 
in recent cases.71  
 
 
2000). 
 64. Tokkyohō [Japanese Patent Law], Law No. 171 of 1959. 
 65. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000). 
 66. Statistics show the proportion of cases in which a defense of invalidity was used has steadily 
increased to reach eighty percent in 2006. JAPAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION, 
SHINGAISOSHŌ NI OKERU TOKKYOMUKŌ NO KŌBEN NO KENKYŪ [STUDY OF DEFENSE OF PATENT 
INVALIDITY], available at http://www.jipa.or.jp/content/jyohou_hasin/sympo/temp/07sym_tkkyo2.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2009). 
 67. Id.  
 68. Tokkyohō [Japanese Patent Law], art. 102. For the legislative history of the revision, see 
Toshiko Takenaka, Patent Infringement Damages in Japan and the United States: Will Increased 
Patent Infringement Damage Awards Revive the Japanese Economy?, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 309, 
321 (2000). 
 69. For information on IP case length and the number of IP cases filed from 1997 to 2007, see 
Tōkei: Chitekizaisankenkankeiminjijiken no shimju kisai kensū oyobi heikinshinrikikan 
(Zenkokuchisai daiisshin) [Intellectual Property High Court Statistics: New and Existing Filed Cases 
and Average Trial Length of Intellectual Property Related Civil Cases], http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/ 
aboutus/stat_03.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2009). 
 70. INST. OF INTELLECTUAL PROP., REPORT ON CURRENT SITUATIONS IN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 
DISPUTES 91 (2006). 
 71. Id. Seventy percent of the claimed amount was awarded in 2000 but only twenty percent was 
awarded in 2003. 
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This relatively small impact resulted from Japanese judges’ 
interpretation of U.S. case law; they converted negative factors used to 
reject causation between infringement and damages under pre-1998 
practice into deductible factors, which reduce the amount of damages 
established by patentees.72 Another reason is the frequent denial of 
reasonable royalties with respect to infringing products when the patentee 
has failed to establish causation for lost profits.73 This resulted from the 
JPO’s failure to include express language to guarantee reasonable royalties 
as the minimum compensation for patent infringement damages while 
maintaining the language to give courts discretion to reduce the amount 
exceeding a reasonable royalty.74 Japanese patentees have not relied on the 
new calculation as frequently as expected because the calculation requires 
a disclosure of per-unit net profits on patented products.75 As a result, the 
huge gap between Japanese and U.S. damages remains, although the 
revision has doubled the average damages awarded by Japanese courts. 
In addition, due to the increased uncertainty in validity and limited 
damages, the chances for Japanese courts to find infringement still remains 
the lowest among major industrialized countries (i.e., the United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, and Germany).76 Reflecting the courts’ 
unfriendly attitude, the number of patent cases filed with Japanese courts 
has significantly decreased over the last few years.77 
The least successful adoption of the U.S. system occurred in the area of 
legal education. The new “American-style” law schools have poorly 
served the goal of educating IP professionals with international 
competitiveness and interdisciplinary backgrounds. The new Japanese bar 
exam, modeled after U.S. state bar exams, was originally expected to have 
a passing rate as high as 70% to 80%;78 however, the passing rates for the 
first (2006) and second (2007) exams were much lower than that: 48.35% 
 
 
 72. For more discussion of the 1998 revision’s impact, see Toshiko Takenaka, Adequate 
Compensation for Patent Infringement Damages: A Comparative Study of Damage Measurements in 
Japan and the United States, in PATENT LAW AND THEORY (Toshiko Takenaka ed., forthcoming Mar. 
2009); Toshiko Takenaka, Harmonizing Patent Infringement Damages: A Lesson from Japanese 
Experiences, in PATENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN A GLOBAL WORLD 463 (Wolrad Prinz zu 
Waldeck und Pyrmont et al. eds., 2008). 
 73. Judgment of IP High Court, Sept. 25, 2006; Judgment of Osaka District Court, Apr. 19, 2007.  
 74. Tokkyohō [Japanese Patent Law], Law No. 171 of 1959, art. 102. 
 75. INST. OF INTELLECTUAL PROP., supra note 70, at 173. Patentees requested lost profits under 
article 102, paragraph 1, only in ten percent of all cases in which damages are awarded. 
 76. Michael Elmer, International Patent Enforcement Strategy—Choice of Jurisdiction, in 
LEGAL CONSULTATION OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES RESOLUTION 191 
(Toshiko Takenaka & Kazunori Yamagami eds., 2006). 
 77. See Intellectual Property High Court Statistics, supra note 69. 
 78. THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 44, at ch. III, pt. 2(2)(2)(d).  
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and 40.18%, respectively.79 The passing rate for the third exam (2008) is 
expected to be even lower, around 35%.80 Further, new law school 
graduates can take the bar exam only three times within five years of 
graduating law school. This low passing rate, combined with the limited 
number of test-taking opportunities, significantly discourages prospective 
students who already work in the industry from leaving their jobs and 
enrolling in law school. Also, only a few Japanese law schools offer 
evening programs due to a fear that evening students would not have 
enough time to study, and the resulting low rates of passage would 
negatively impact the school ranking.81 The percentage of law students 
with job experience has significantly decreased after the Department of 
Justice announced the low passing rate.82  
Unlike the U.S. system, where undergraduate-level legal education was 
developed into graduate level education, MEXT did not remove 
undergraduate legal education when it adopted graduate legal education. It 
allowed Japanese law schools to take into account the student’s 
undergraduate education and permit students with a bachelor’s in law to 
finish law school in two years rather than three. In other words, graduates 
of non-law undergraduate departments are reluctant to compete with those 
who already have four years of legal education. Contrary to the 
government’s expectation, the percentage of students with science 
backgrounds has remained relatively small and has gradually decreased 
since 2004. 83 
The new law school system failed to meet the goal of training lawyers 
to compete in the global market. With a high chance of failing the bar 
exam, Japanese law students concentrate their education on bar exam 
subjects. Fortunately, IP is a popular optional subject for the bar exam and 
many students take IP classes.84 However, students are not interested in 
 
 
 79. Results of the 2007 bar exam are available at http://www.moj.go.jp/SHIKEN/ 
SHINSHIHOU/h19kekka01-4.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2009). Colin P.A. Jones, Japan’s Push to Add 
Lawyers Fraught with Troubles, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticle 
NLJ.jsp?id=120242430 9363. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Only eight out of seventy-four law schools offer evening programs.  
 82. SELF-ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 26. Only 48.4% of the 2004 law school entering 
student body were students with work experience. However, this percentage decreased to 32.1% in 
2007. Statistics on the student body entering law schools in 2004 to 2007 are available at 
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou/16/05/04051301.htm (2004); http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/ 
houdou/17/05/05052002.htm (2005); http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou/18/05/06051209/001. 
htm (2006); http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou/19/05/07051423/001.htm (2007). 
 83. SELF-ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 26. Only 8.4% of entering law school students in 
2004 held a science or engineering degree. However, the percentage went down to 4.8% in 2007.  
 84. The Department of Justice introduced IP as an elective subject in 2006. It was the third most 
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studying advanced IP topics, including U.S. and European IP systems, 
which are beyond the scope of the bar exam. Despite students’ lack of 
interest in subjects unrelated to the bar exam, law schools are required to 
offer foreign law and advanced topics. In fact, MEXT wants to carry on 
with the original mission of legal system reform and require law schools to 
teach a wider variety of subjects.85 Law schools that focus their curriculum 
on bar exam preparation will be subjected to the risk of poor results from 
periodical assessments by outside evaluators. In short, law schools face a 
dilemma between the desire to meet the needs of students and the need to 
avoid a violation of the MEXT standard. 
Even if law students are able to pass their bar exam, finding a job is not 
easy. Since the old exam remains in place until 2010, current law students 
must compete with students who passed a bar exam with significantly 
lower passing rates.86 Because Japanese law firms are more familiar with 
students who passed the old exam, and because students who pass the old 
exam find out their exam results earlier than those who take the new exam, 
law firms prefer to hire the former students with whose qualifications they 
are familiar. The Japanese legal market is also very reluctant to hire new 
law school graduates, even though its needs motivated the increase in the 
number of lawyers through legal reform. This is because the seniority 
system in the Japanese market makes it very difficult to set job 
descriptions and compensation without precedent.  
Members of the first entering class from the new law schools who 
passed the bar exam would have completed their judicial training in 2008, 
 
 
popular subject among eight elective subjects in 2006 through 2008. See Monbukagakushō [MEXT], 
Heisei 19nendo hōkadaigakuin nyūgakusha senpatsujisshijyōkyōno gaiyō [Summary of the Entrance 
Examination for Law School in 2007], http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou/19/05/07051423/ 
001.htm (2007) (last visited Mar. 12, 2009); Hōmushō daijinkanbō jinjika [Ministry of Justice, 
Minister’s Secretariat Personnel Div.], Heisei 19nen shinshihōshiken no kekka [Results of the 2007 
Bar Examination Under the New Exam Style], http://www.moj.go.jp/SHIKEN/SHINSHIHOU/ 
h19kekka01-4.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2009); Hōmushō daijinkanbō jinjika [Ministry of Justice, 
Minister’s Secretariat Personnel Div.], Heisei 19nen shinshihōshiken no kekka [Results of the 2008 
Bar Examination Under the New Exam Style], http://www.moj.go.jp/SHIKEN/SHINSHIHOU/ 
h20kekka01-4.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2009). 
 85. MEXT, CENTRAL EDUCATION COUNCIL, UNIVERSITY COMMITTEE, LAW SCHOOL 
SUBCOMMITTEE, REPORT ON DIRECTION FOR LEGAL EDUCATION AT LAW SCHOOLS IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE MISSION OF LEGAL SYSTEM REFORM (2007), http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/ 
chukyo/chukyo4/houkoku/07122014/001.pdf. 
 86. The average passing rate for the old exam over the last decade was 3%, although the rate for 
the 2006 exam was 1.81%. The passing rates between 1989 and 2006 are available at 
http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/061109-1/18syutu-gou.html. For the 2007 and 2008 results, see 
Hōmushō daijinkanbō jinjika [Ministry of Justice, Minister’s Secretariat Personnel Div.], Heisei 
20nendo Kyushihōshiken dainijishiken no kekka nituite [Results of the Second Level Bar Examination 
Under the Old Exam Style], http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/081113-1/20soukatu.html (last visited Mar. 
12, 2009). 
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and yet many of them are still unable to find a job at a law firm or in 
industry. Some accepted positions at law firms equivalent to resident 
doctors at U.S. hospitals, working for little or no compensation to receive 
practical training. These lawyers are called Noki-ben (“eaves lawyers”), 
i.e., lawyers who rent space just to avoid the wind and rain. The number of 
Noki-ben is expected to rise as the number of graduates with judicial 
training increases. Getting a Noki-ben position has already become highly 
competitive. 
However, once the relatively low bar exam passing rate was 
announced, the Japanese IP community expected that it would be difficult 
to educate IP professionals in the new law schools. To carry out the action 
plans in the Strategic Programs, MEXT created two IP professional 
schools that have a unique curriculum to educate students in both the legal 
and business aspects of managing IP rights.87 Both schools aim to attract 
students who currently work in the industry and both offer evening classes 
to entice students who already have jobs. Unlike law school instruction, 
courses at these professional schools are taught by experienced patent 
attorneys and retired in-house counsels of major technology companies. 
Furthermore, students are not expected to pass a national exam. Thus, 
these schools are better suited than law schools to face the challenge of 
preparing students to pass the bar exam and find jobs. 
Although its new law school system failed to give IP lawyers with 
science backgrounds and specialized skill sets the education required to 
work in the global market, the Japanese government has been successful in 
increasing the number of IP professionals and expanding IP protection in 
Japanese society. Currently, free IP-related seminars are generally offered 
in Tokyo every day and even on weekends. These seminars are designed 
for both lawyers and non-lawyers like scientists, engineers, and business 
people. Intensive training programs that would cost a fortune in the United 
States are offered by Japanese universities free of charge, thanks to 
government funding. Furthermore, narrowing the scope of what is tested 
by the patent bar has increased the number of patent attorneys, leading to 
attorney fee and prosecution cost discounts. Some argue that the quality of 
the services offered by newly admitted attorneys has declined; however, 
the competition among these attorneys is expected to improve their 
quality. 
 
 
 87. Two IP professional schools were created, one each in Tokyo and Osaka, in April 2005. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
It took more than a decade for the Japanese government to catch up 
with Professor Haley. Although METI and JPO officers now share his 
views, Japanese judges are still more influenced by tradition and are 
reluctant to change their sense of justice when dealing with IP rights and 
underlying policies. Other Asian countries transitioning from being 
technology importers to technology exporters could learn from the 
Japanese example of stimulating its economy after losing its competitive 
power due to the disappearance of cheap labor. 
Japan’s experience demonstrates the challenges that come with 
changing a well-established legal system and culture by importing a 
foreign system. Since the U.S. systems that were copied were built into the 
existing system, they are localized through judicial interpretation or 
compromise with parties whose interests were at stake in the old system. 
Some may view such localization negatively as a failure to move the 
Japanese IP system more in line with its U.S. counterpart, which is the 
global standard. However, the goal of Japan’s national strategy was to 
develop its own unique IP system and policy while learning from U.S. 
experiences. Japan attained this goal through localization.  
The ultimate mission of Japan’s national IP strategy was to improve its 
international competitiveness and revive its economy. This mission has 
been successfully completed. The technology import-export balance 
became a surplus the year Japan adopted the IP Strategies and this surplus 
has steadily expanded since then.88 Its international competitiveness 
rankings have been gradually improving, even though the most recent 
ranking went down.89 The Japanese economy had also recently shown a 
strong recovery from its recession, until the global economic crisis hit. 
Although there is no direct evidence that the recovery was prompted by 
the METI-JPO adoption of the pro-patent policy and national strategies, 
finding such evidence would likely be impossible. Assuming that the 
recovery is indeed the result of the national IP strategy, it seems that had 
the Japanese government listened to Professor Haley’s comments two 
 
 
 88. MEXT, HEISEI 19NEN KAGAKU GIJYU TSU HAKUSHO [2007 SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY WHITE 
PAPER] (2007), available at http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/hpaa200701/033.htm. 
 89. Japan’s international competitiveness ranking from the International Institute for 
Management Development went down in 2007, as did its ranking by the Global Competitiveness 
Report. METI, Wagakuni no sangyōgijutsu nikansuru kenkyū kaihatsu katsudōno dōkō—Shuyōshihyō 
to chōsadēta—[TRENDS OF R&D ACTIVITIES IN INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES IN JAPAN] (2008), 
available at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/tech_research/20_indicator/japanese(h20.03).pdf.  
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decades ago, Japan would not have lost out on the technology boom of the 
1990s. 
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